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Introduction 
Over the past decade, as the Third Wave of democratisation has stalled and began to 
recede, attention has increasingly shifted to understanding the internal workings and 
governance of non-democratic regimes. Core distinctions between military, party and 
personalist regime types have received renewed attention (Brooker, 2014; Cheibub, 2007; 
Gandhi, 2010) and new classifications of non- or semi-democratic regime types are 
proliferating in number and complexity. Concepts such as competitive authoritarianism 
indicate the evolution of traditional, rigid forms of non-democratic regime to more 
disguised or fluid formations (Levitsky and Way, 2010). He and Warren (2011: 269) note that 
such ŚǇďƌŝĚ  ‘ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ŵŝǆ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ƌƵůĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
consultative forums, political parties and legislatures that we would normally associate with 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?In adopting the appearance and language of democracy non-democratic 
regimes have sought to legitimise their rule on terms that are deemed acceptable by the 
international community. Recognising the array of forms of governance in authoritarian 
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regimes is an important task in moving away from a simple binary democratic-authoritarian 
classification. In turn, this has the potential to raise challenging questions for the 
governance of democratic regimes, due to the disillusionment with  ‘politics as usual ? and 
the rise of populist and exclusionary regimes, which may presage processes of de-
democratisation (see Tilly, 2006). 
 
This essay considers variations in forms of authoritarian governance as they have emerged 
and consolidated in the contemporary era. The aim is to determine whether there are 
common themes that can be identified in the governance of authoritarian regimes. It also 
examines how these patterns of governance have changed and evolved in relation to 
opportunities and threats in the broader context. The three books considered here draw out 
variations in authoritarian governance across differing temporal and geographical spaces 
and scales. The edited collection by Backes and Kailitz examines the role of ideology in 
animating a particular regime type historically, providing an important measure of how 
legitimacy can be sought and managed by non-democratic regimes. The role of black knights 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ  ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-hegemonic powers whose economic, military and/or diplomatic 
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ŵĂǇ ďůƵŶƚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ Žƌ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝƐŝŶŐ Žƌ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?  ?tĂǇ ?
2015: 691) is gaining in significance (see also Chou, 2016). In this line, Bader examines the 
growing influence of China as an international actor and potential black knight, bringing a 
focus to the export of authoritarian soft-power. Finally, Giraudy examines the existence of 
subnational authoritarian regimes in nominally democratic states, an issue that has 
implications that reach beyond the study of authoritarian governance to challenge 
established beliefs about democratic systems and their homogeneity. Together the three 
books provide a comprehensive assessment of some of the key issues in the study of 
authoritarian regimes, contributing to the task of revealing hidden depths that have 
previously been overlooked or obscured.  
 
The essay begins by examining the role of ideology and the forms of legitimation strategies 
adopted authoritarian regimes to maintain order and control. In the second section the 
focus shifts to the apparent rise of authoritarian soft power in the form of the black knight, 
addressing the extent to which such regimes can use support to generate international 
legitimacy and allies. The third section shifts the focus to the subnational level, considering 
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how authoritarian enclaves can persist in democratic states and the associated governance 
implications for such regimes. Finally, the essay brings together the themes that have been 
developed to draw out lessons for the assessment of authoritarian governance. 
 
Ideocracies and Legitimation of Authoritarian Governance 
Authoritarian legitimacy is an area of significance, in view of its role in generating stability 
and reducing threats. In the absence of authority that has been gained through legitimacy a 
regime will be forced to rely on coercion and the exercise of power as domination to 
maintain order (see Haugaard, 2010). By successfully appealing to a wider ideological base, 
a regime is able to move the focus of attention beyond the immediate issues around 
government structures and focus on the future ideal. Considering the role of ideology, 
Brooker (2014: 114 emphasis in original) has argued that: 
the ideological claim to legitimacy has been distinctive in having both a narrower 
ƐĞŶƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶ ƚŚĞ ? ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƌƵůĞ ?ĂŶĚĂ broader sense that involves a 
less direct legitimation of the regime in terms of the goals and principles enshrined 
in the ideology. 
Drawing a distinction between the narrow and broad forms of ideological legitimation 
enables a closer consideration of the relative strength of the regime. In the absence of a 
broad ideological base a governing elite will be forced to rely more heavily on coercive 
measures to maintain control, a practice that in turn threatens the longer-term viability as 
discontent and dissent fester in the absence of positive dispositions regarding the regime.  
 
Attempts by non-democratic regimes to generate legitimacy have increasingly seen them 
turn to tools and approaches normally associated with democratic political systems. In the 
absence of negative feedback mechanisms, non-democratic regimes must find other ways of 
recognising and addressing demands from below (see Dryzek, 1988). Elections have become 
an important measure of generating a sense of legitimacy (Levitsky and Way, 2010) and as 
mechanisms for managing internal power relations (Golosov, 2016). While elections present 
ĂƌŝƐŬŽĨĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƐŚŽůĚŽŶƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶďĞŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
opposition is effectively prevented from gaining power (see Morgenbesser, 2016). As He 
(2014; see also He and Warren, 2011) has argued, the use of deliberation by the Chinese 
regime provides a way of improving governance and enhancing its authority. Adoption of 
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mechanisms associated with democratic political systems by authoritarian regimes 
illustrates the fact they are not in themselves inherently democratic, rather they are simply 
tools of governance. Recognising the fluidity in the governance arrangements of 
authoritarian regimes is important, in order to enable a more balanced assessment of their 
capacities. 
 
The socialist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union demonstrate the way in which 
ideological bases need to be protected and nurtured. While the degree of true support for 
these regimes among the population may have been low, they were able to point to a 
shared ideology to create an identity sufficiently robust to prevent serious challenges 
emerging from within for much of their existence. Focusing on the role of ideology, Backes 
and Kailitz (2016: 1) argue that ideocracies as a particular regime type rely heavily on a 
broad ideological base, as: 
ideocratic rulers not only claim to have the right to rule but also, on the basis of the 
utopian regime ideology, claim to be free to control and (radically) transform all 
aspects of society. 
The extreme degree of control and self-justification of such regimes puts them into a 
category of their own, as they seek to overhaul social, political and economic relations in 
pursuit of the ideal. Although the number of ideocracies has fallen since their peak in the 
20th century, the echoes of communist and fascist regimes continue to be felt today. Many 
of the tools these regimes developed and adopted translate to less ideologically driven 
regimes, which seek to develop legitimacy that will enable them to reshape the system in 
their image. The evolution of the Erdogan regime in Turkey provides an example of a 
democratic regime that has relied on a broad ideological base to establish and maintain 
control, moving in a more exclusionary authoritarian direction over time  ?PŶŝƔ ? ? ? ? ?). 
 
Radical change envisaged by ideocratic regimes requires the establishment and 
maintenance of control over the population, to ensure support and stability. Kailitz (308) 
asserts ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞ  ‘ŶŽideocracy can ever truly dominate society in all spheres [this] does 
ŶŽƚ ? ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ? ŝĚĞŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐ ƐƚƌŝǀĞ ĨŽƌ ƐƵĐŚ ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? tŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ƐƵĐŚ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ƌĞůǇ ŽŶ Ă ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ŽĨ ƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?(305) while actively controlling internal opponents. The cases considered in 
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Ideocracies in Comparison: Legitimation  W Cooptation  W Repression, focusing primarily on 
fascist (Italy and Germany) and communist (the Soviet Union, the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), China, North Korea, Cuba), demonstrate that attempts to exert control in 
this manner have historically been linked with totalitarian political systems. In contrast with 
other forms of non-democratic regime types, totalitarian regimes are driven by a chiliastic 
ŝĚĞĂů ?  ‘ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ƚŽ Ă ĨŝŶĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ? ?
(Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956: 22) This means that while the ideocratic category is useful in 
describing historical cases, it may be less successful in capturing the range of disguised or 
competitive authoritarian regimes that proliferate in the contemporary period (Levitsky and 
Way, 2010). 
 
A key element of the states considered in the collection, manifest in their attempt to 
transform society, is a complete rejection of the existing order. Distinguishing between 
different forms of ideology ?ĞƌŶŚŽůǌ  ? ? ? ? ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐ  ‘ƚŚŽƐĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚ
ƚŚŽƐĞŽĨĂŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞďŽŽŬwere primarily rooted in 
the real world, focused on working towards the achievement of some earthly utopia. By 
contrast, contemporary ideocratic regimes, such as Iran are rooted more firmly in the 
metaphysical, potentially leading to tensions between the revealed ideology and the 
structures of governance (Ghobadzadeh and Rahim, 2016). Although Iran is generally 
classified as a theocracy, locating it within the broader frame of ideocracy enables 
comparisons with other such regimes to be drawn. The Iranian regime has relied on a 
religious base to justify the construction of an institutional and social environment that 
advances a particular vision of society, suppressing or removing views that challenge the 
espoused ideology. Giving greater attention to regimes that rely on ideological bases in this 
manner is increasingly important in the face of resurgent religious narratives internationally. 
 
In focusing on the role of ideology and attempting to move away from the (totalitarian) 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? 'ƌŝĨĨŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŶĞĂƚ Ěistinctions between ideocratic and 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ ĚƌĂǁŶ ? ?ĂƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ĐĂŶĂůƐŽ ƐĞĞŬ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚ
ƐƚŝĨůĞ ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ǀĂůƵĞƐ  ?ƐĞĞ ĂůƐŽ ŚŽƵ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
central theme in the governance of ideocratic regimes is what steps can be taken to ensure 
compliance beyond the winning coalition or inner elite (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 
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2011). Backes and Kailitz (5) identify legitimation, co-optation and repression as the three 
ĐŽƌĞ ƚŽŽůƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?Ɛ disposal. These tools represent increasingly harder forms of 
control and as such legitimation strategies are preferred. Turning to more direct control in 
the form of co-optation and repression will impose greater costs on the regime, in terms of 
resources and credibility, and are therefore less sustainable over the longer-term. The 
ability of a regime to rely on a legitimation strategy is dependent on its capacity to deliver 
on promises made. As Schmidt (293) notes, the costs of failing to achieve targets are 
significant, ranging from reinterpretation of ideals or stagnation through to collapse. 
Maintaining effective output or performance legitimacy therefore becomes vital to the 
continued stability of the regime, with co-optation and repression held in reserve and 
deployed selectively. 
 
The use of repression by ideocratic regimes may be limited by the desire to ensure longer-
term sustainability, yet represents an important element of their practice. As noted above, 
the regime will attempt to limit direct opposition to its rule, with the use of violence as a key 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ? ĞƌŶŚŽůǌ  ? ? ? ? ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŬĞƉƚ ƐŝŵƉůĞ ?
 ?ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ƐĐĂƉĞŐŽĂƚƐ ? ĐĂƉĂďůĞ ŽĨ ĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ďůĂŵĞ ĨŽƌ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐ ?
Further unpacking the formƐ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ƵƐĞĚ ? DĂđŬſǁ  ? ? ? ? ? ĚƌĂǁƐ Ă ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ƚĂƌŐĞƚŝŶŐ ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ŶŽŶ-selective 
(widely spread) political violence, often extending to whole societies, and generally has a 
preventative cŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ?dŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂĨŽƌŵ
of regulation, maintaining stability and enabling effective governance, with increases being 
clearly linked to a loss of control. As Arendt (1966: 464-66) argued, terror in the form of 
political violence passes through phases involving the elimination of resistance, elimination 
of perceived threats and finally the introduction of randomised, indiscriminate terror. The 
regulative character of political violence in such regimes further reinforces the notion that 
ideocracies exist at the more extreme of the spectrum of non-democratic regime types. 
 
Rise of the Black Knight 
The number of ideocracies appears to have declined over the past century, while the range 
of authoritarian regimes remains broad and relatively numerous. As noted above, learning 
by authoritarian regimes has led to new means of shielding from external influence (Escribà-
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Folch and Wright, 2015; Levitsky and Way, 2010). In addition, questions have been raised 
regarding the extent to which international autocracy promotion may be emerging as a 
phenomenon by which non-democratic regimes insulate themselves by supporting 
likeminded regimes (Way, 2015). The use of resources to develop and support allies was an 
important tool for both sides during the Cold War, as they sought to gain the upper hand in 
the competition for global influence. The continued spread of globalisation and the 
associated increase in regional integration in the contemporary period have provided new 
fora in which democratic and non-democratic regimes can engage in mutual support 
(Ambrosio, 2008; Bearce and Tirone, 2010). Following a script set down by Western 
democracy promoters (Whitehead, 2015), authoritarian regimes are able to use soft power 
and resources to influence states abroad that share their aims (Agné, 2014). 
 
Of the supposed black knights, China has been identified as a leading proponent due to its 
growing economic and political influence, adopting subtle forms of support to achieve its 
goals (Hartig, 2015). This contrasts with ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĂďůǇmore confrontational 
approach to promoting its interests abroad (Hudson, 2015). The apparent success of China 
in portraying itself as a positive influence on the international stage has even led to 
questions regarding the ability of autocratic regimes to influence established democratic 
states in times of disillusionment with democratic politics (Chou et al, 2016). In spite of the 
apparent spread of autocratic assistance and influence internationally, the direct causal 
effect is not immediately obvious, as recipient states are still faced with domestic priorities. 
Recent work has reinforced the fact that pressure from external democracy or autocracy 
promoters to influence a state is filtered through the interests and agendas of domestic 
elites (Freyburg and Richter, 2015; Hackenesch, 2015). 
 
/Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ :ƵůŝĂ ĂĚĞƌ ?ƐŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^ƵƌǀŝǀĂů ŽĨ ƵƚŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐ 
provides a detailed and considered examination of how China has attempted to act on and 
influence domestic politics in three of its neighbours. Focusing on how China has engaged 
Burma, Cambodia, and Mongolia, Bader is able to tease out the role of domestic incentives 
in acceding to foreign pressure. Central to the argument is the selectorate theory, which 
ĂŝŵƐƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ‘ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶĂƵƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĂƐĂŶŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞĨŽƌŵĂũŽƌƉŽǁĞƌƐƚŽĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞĂƵƚŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?6; 
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also Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011). The analysis identifies which groups exercise 
control within the state and the breadth of the governing coalition. The exercise of 
authoritarian soft power benefits from the presence of a relatively narrow coalition able to 
exert its will over the instruments of the state. As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) note, 
elite motivations will determine the priorities of the regime and the ability of foreign 
pressure and influence to impact domestic practice, as the ultimate goal of the incumbent 
regime is survival and the avoidance of future punishment (see also Escribà-Folch and 
Wright, 2015). 
 
Analysing the cases, Bader argues that the relationship between the size of the winning 
coalition and willingness to comply is not immediately apparent. Burma, with a relatively 
small winning coalition would appear to be susceptible to overtures from China. However, 
ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ‘ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌďĞƚter 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?  ? ? ? ? in Burma to safeguard its own 
reputation. This raises an important and potentially neglected aspect of the literature on 
authoritarian diffusion, that of reputational risk. As an international actor, China is 
increasingly visible and influential, making it difficult to openly support regimes that are 
ĚĞĞŵĞĚŽǀĞƌůǇŚĂƌƐŚĂŶĚŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĂůƐŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚEŽƌƚŚ
Korea). In contrast to Burma, Cambodia has readily accepted Chinese influence and has 
sought to strengthen ties. The difference between the two regimes can be traced to the 
more secure domestic situation of the Burmese junta. A further factor that Bader briefly 
refers to is the degree of cultural affinity and historical ties, as these can influence the 
perception of pressure being exerted. Further development of this factor could include 
consideration of the role of culture in shaping potential for influence (see Shin, 2012). 
 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚDŽŶŐŽůŝĂƉƌĞsents a further complication in terms of the influence 
of authoritarian soft power. In contrast to Burma and Cambodia, Mongolia is a democratic 
state with a large winning coalition and historical tensions that complicate the relationship. 
In order to gain influence the Chinese state must find ways of building trust and support as 
 ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ĐĂŶŚĂƌĚůǇƚĂŬĞĂǀĞƌǇƉƌŽ-Chinese position in public because of the strong 
Sino-ƉŚŽďŝĐ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ DŽŶŐŽůŝĂŶ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? In such a context, support 
from China will be viewed with suspicion, reducing the potential effectiveness of soft power. 
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The effects of the global financial crisis are identified as a turning point in the relations 
between the two countries, as Mongolia was forced to turn increasingly to China for 
support. Together, the cases suggest that while the institutional patterns and the size of the 
winning coalition are significant in determining how China engages, deeper contextual 
factors and changes in the external environment have a significant role to play in 
determining how such influence is interpreted. 
 
Bader identifies a number of patterns in considering the wider implications of regime type 
ŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ƚĂŶĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞ ůĞǀĞů, China has tended to target autocratic 
regimes in line with the notion of smaller winning coalitions. It is also argued that larger 
countries tend to receive more attention from China, suggesting that more pragmatic 
concerns around economic benefits shape such behaviour, alongside issues of regional 
stability. In contrast to democracy promotion, it could be argued that autocracy promotion 
is driven less by idealistic values and more by pragmatic real politic, bolstering the position 
ŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĐŽƌĞ ?ĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ also suggests that autocratic states with higher levels 
of trade with China tend to last longer than those that do not, presenting China as a 
stabilising force overall. 
 
The Challenge of Subnational Authoritarianism 
A further issue with regards to authoritarian governance is the relative influence of 
institutions and elites at the national and subnational level. Within the territory of a 
democratic state it is possible that some subnational units may operate in ways that can be 
classified as authoritarian, due to factors such as historical practices, culture or geography. 
This is even possible in democratic political systems where the costs for the central state of 
challenging entrenched interests may be high. Behrend and Whitehead (2016: 155) argue 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ƐƐƉƌĞĂĚwithin nation-states remains uneven. In many countries that are 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂƚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞů ?ƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĞĚŵĂǇǀĂƌǇ
markedly from one sub-ƵŶŝƚƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ? Democratic structures present the opportunity for 
illiberal elites to distort the system to suit their particular interests, playing on local cultural 
or social interests. On the other side, Gilley (2010) argues that it is also possible for 
democratic enclaves to emerge in authoritarian states. Regardless of the direction, where 
the subnational governance patterns differ from those at the national level there is the 
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possibility of tension and conflicting interests. The existence of subnational enclaves in 
democratic states may suggest shallow democratisation or limited capacity, and as such may 
resolve over time as consolidation takes place or point to risk of future de-democratisation. 
 
China presents a complex and interesting case with which to illustrate patterns of 
subnational governance in authoritarian regimes. The view of the Chinese state as a unified 
entity obscures levels of subnational variation in the degree of control exercised and 
openness to non-state actors. Teets (2014:1) has argued that the situation facing civil 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝŶŚŝŶĂŝƐŶŽƚ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƐƚĂƚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĂĂǀŝĚĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ
Ă 'ŽůŝĂƚŚ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ? ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ Ă ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƐultative authoritarianism where civil 
society actors are included where they are deemed useful (see also Fewsmith, 2013). 
Subnational levels of government determine the degree of freedom permitted within the 
guidance of the central state, with these decisions shaped by the level of capacity and the 
associated need for support from civil society actors, as well as to defuse tension. Civil 
society activities can serve as a useful gauge for internal discontent, partially drawing on the 
historical practice of using the will of the people to challenge decisions of the central state 
in the interest of just and effective rule (see He, 2014; Hung, 2011). In providing space for 
subnational governments to develop best practice, the Chinese state has been able to draw 
on successful innovations and encourage their adoption more broadly (Teets, 2014).  
 
In addition to permitting participation of civil society actors, developments in the Chinese 
political system also suggest the emergence of opportunities for more proactive 
participation. He and Warren (2011: 274) argue that deliberative authoritarianism, where 
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƚŚĞŐŝǀĞĂŶĚƚĂŬĞŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?ƚŽ
ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞ ? ?ŚĂƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚŝn a context where the decision making 
powers are too dispersed to allow more direct forms of control. The reasons for the 
introduction of deliberative practices are complicated, but can be linked to the desire of the 
regime to pre-empt more direct challenges to the legitimacy of the regime and manage any 
calls for reform that emerge (He and Warren, 2011). Introducing reforms that give the 
appearance of liberalisation present risks, as they can be used to challenge the regime 
where internal opposition adopt the opportunities and make them real (Ritter, 2015). 
Therefore, although the regime permits a degree of deliberation He (2014: 73) notes that 
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there are shortcomings in authoritarian deliberation ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐŝŵƉŽƐĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĞ ? W ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ƚhe elitist disposition, and the control over political discourse by 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ?This suggests that when examining democratic and authoritarian regimes it is 
important to consider the variation that exists behind the national façade and how this is 
managed. 
  
Tensions and patterns of divergence between national and subnational level institutions are 
an important factor, driven by resource considerations, ideology and more basic issues of 
control. Varying levels of state capacity mean that more open forms of governance may 
emerge in authoritarian regimes at the local level, while the possibility of authoritarian 
enclaves in nominally democratic states may result from proximity and the desire for 
control. At the local level, mechanisms of control and the flow of information are more 
immediate, enabling dissenters to be punished or marginalised with limited central 
oversight (Barraca, 2007). This possibility has led Behrend and Whitehead (2016: 156) to 
argue that: 
it is imperative to track the global advance (or retreat) of democracy not merely by 
counting how many countries are national-level democratic polities, but also by 
measuring and tracing subnational variations. 
The relative strength of subnational elites is important for more than simply the affected 
population, as mobilisation of support at this level can be important in shaping decisions 
made at the national level in systems where the central state lacks capacity (Barraca, 2007). 
In democratising or weakly democratic states localised, subnational interests may rely on 
persistent authoritarian structures to constrain the extent and impact of reforms to protect 
established private interests. Considering patterns of authoritarian governance therefore 
requires examination of patterns all the way down, drilling down from the national level to 
uncover areas of authoritarian (or democratic) resilience. 
 
While the relationship between national and subnational regimes with different characters 
may be seen as antagonistic, leading to an expectation that democratic regimes would want 
to root out internal authoritarian elements, the reality is more complicated. Incentives 
generated by the desire to hold power mean that accommodations may be reached as each 
level seeks to safeguard its interests. Agustina Giraudy in Democrats and Autocrats: 
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Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity within Democratic Countries 
points to the degree of patrimonialism and fiscal autonomy as the key features when 
ĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŚĂƉĞ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ǁŚĞƌĞ
patrimonial state structures prevail, autocrats stand in a strong position to centralize 
authority and thus maintain political control over their domĂŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?-6) Control of resources 
enables the local autocrat to deprive opponents of fiscal resources and also access to non-
fiscal tools, such as media and links to central state authorities. The second characteristic, in 
the guise of fiscal autonomy, shapes the degree of direct influence the central state can 
exercise in how resources are deployed and who has responsibility. Together, these factors 
can increase or decrease the ability of opposition actors to force subnational undemocratic 
regimes to democratise and open up to competition. 
 
Examining the situation in Argentina and Mexico, Giraudy argues that the relationship 
between the levels of government within the state is more complex than the two core 
factors would suggest. To exert leverage and force change in the subnational regime, the 
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƐƵďũƵŐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƵƚŽĐƌĂƚ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƚƵƌŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŽĐƌĂƚ ?Ɛ
ability to resist must be minimal (75). While these conditions are necessary, they are not 
sufficient in themselves to lead to change. The uncertainty of the democratic process 
(particularly in weakly democratised states) means that there may be benefits to be derived 
from having subnational autocrats under the control of the central authorities, as these can 
be used to shore up support in troubled or marginal regions. In both Argentina and Mexico, 
histories of authoritarianism have shaped the expectations of what governance entails. This 
is apparent in the fact that 5 of 24 provinces in Argentina and 15 of 32 provinces in Mexico 
are classified as undemocratic (42). The challenge is to determine how these regimes have 
been able to sustain themselves within states that are nominally democratic. 
 
 ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƉŽŝŶƚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ŝŶ 'ŝƌĂƵĚǇ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƐƵďŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
undemocratic units does not in itself hamper governance by the central state. Subnational 
autocrats have an interest in perpetuating their rule to ensure continued access to the 
rewards of office and potentially to avoid punishment for past actions. In such a situation, 
subnational autocrats may be willing to work within the agenda of the central government 
where it does not negatively affect these core interests, something that has deeper 
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implications for democratisation. As noted above, hybrid or semi-authoritarian regimes 
have proliferated in recent times at the national level, making the possibility of identifying 
and challenging less visible subnational regimes even less likely, especially where this may 
threaten the stability of the state. Examining historical patterns of democratisation in Latin 
America, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñàn (2013) argue that elite policy preferences and the 
regional environment are key in determining whether democratisation will be initiated at 
the national level. In the case of subnational undemocratic regimes, the introduction of 
democratic mechanisms at the national level may in fact limit chances of democratic 
consolidation, as elite policy preferences focus on stability and electoral competitiveness. 
 
Coping with Authoritarianism 
The three books considered each shed light on forms and features of authoritarian 
governance. Unpacking these themes and examining them in relation to patterns and trends 
in the broader field of authoritarian governance is an important task. Four themes are 
apparent from the review, relating to the role of ideology, the varied character of 
authoritarian governance, multi-level operation of such regimes, and their adaptability. 
Taking these features seriously is a necessary task in moving to a situation in which 
authoritarian governances is understood as real and not dissimilar to democratic 
governance in many ways. Giving due attention and recognition can provide opportunities 
and mechanisms for managing relations with such regimes. 
 
The first theme to consider when assessing authoritarian governance is the role of 
pragmatism versus ideology. Backes and Kailitz present a compelling examination of 
ideocratic regimes that shaped history through the twentieth century. Ideology was central 
in providing a justification for the incumbent regime and in generating some form of 
legitimacy. The historic nature of many of the regimes considered raises questions regarding 
their relevance to the contemporary era, where technology and pressures for good 
governance have squeezed the space in which states operate. ĂĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ
suggests the result may be a shift to a more pragmatic position (also noted by Deng (2011)), 
as regime survival in the face of external pressure requires more nuanced approaches. The 
extent to which such a transition is requires consideration, as moving away from an 
established ideological foundation risks destabilisation. An expansion of the analysis to 
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include regimes in the Middle East (Iran) or Africa (Libya under Gaddafi) may have 
strengthened the argument for the continued relevance of the concept of ideocracy. Iran 
and Libya continued to operate along ideocratic lines while increasingly adopting more 
pragmatic stances in their dealings with the international community. They avoided 
becoming more democratic; maintaining the importance of the key features of their 
ideological legitimation strategies, while becoming less objectionable (within limits) to the 
international community. 
 
A second, related theme is the breadth of the spectrum of authoritarian regime types. 
Analysts were previously able to point to authoritarian regimes with relatively clearly 
defined characteristics, something which is made more difficult with the emergence of new 
forms of semi-authoritarian regimes. In this vein, Levitsky and Way (2010) have identified a 
particular form of competitive authoritarian regime type that adopts some of the tools of 
democracy in an attempt to appear less autocratic. As authoritarianism is changing, it could 
be argued that faith in democracy has been challenged in states that are considered 
democratic (Rosanvallon, 2008). Giraudy analyses the weaknesses at the subnational level in 
Argentina and Mexico in detail, suggesting that surface appearances must not be taken for 
granted and the democratic label must be tested and interrogated. The apparent failure of 
democratic governance to deliver on promises may lead to greater interest in, if not 
acceptance of, authoritarian practices. Bader in particular notes the challenge faced by 
DŽŶŐŽůŝĂĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƌĂŵƉĂŶƚ ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚ ůĞƐƐĞƌ ŝůůƐ ĐĂŶĂůƐŽ ƐŚĂŬĞ Ă ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨĂŝƚŚ ŝŶ
democratic systems (see Chou et al, 2016). When considering contemporary forms of 
authoritarian governance, the lesson is that it is not a zero-sum game; autocratic and 
democratic regimes exist on a spectrum where grey areas persist. 
 
The third theme is that the varied nature of authoritarian governance is also represented in 
the way it operates across multiple levels. Although this is a relatively uncontroversial idea, 
it does require greater consideration to emphasise the interconnectedness character of 
contemporary political systems. The influence of black knights such as China and Russia on 
the behaviour of targeted states appears to be relatively limited in the post-Cold War world. 
However, the challenges faced by democratic states and a possible loosening of democratic 
norms in the face of domestic populism may provide an opportunity for greater influence. In 
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ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŽ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚĨƵů ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?  ?ĂŶŽǀĂŶ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ?
populist claims potentially undermine established political institutions during periods of 
crisis or uncertainty, creating space for authoritarian practices and solutions to emerge. As 
Bader notes in the case of Mongolia, crises can increase the receptiveness to alternative 
ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚďǇĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů  ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ?ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?K ?ƌŝĞŶ  ? ? ? ?5: 338) 
has recently argued that weakly institutionalised democracies are vulnerable to such 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ? ĂƐ  ‘ ?Ƶ]ncertainty over the role and function of the state coupled with the rise of 
ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?  ?ĐĂŶ ůĞĂĚ ? ƚŽ Ă ƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĨŽƌ ƐĐĂƉĞŐŽĂƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?
disguised authoritarian regimes can appear more efficient and attractive. Success of 
authoritarian enclaves at the subnational level may lead to emulation by other subnational 
units and may gain influence at the national level if able to provide an impression of 
stability.  
 
Finally, the analysis demonstrates that regime forms are not static and constantly evolve 
over time. For much of the last quarter of the twentieth century, it was assumed that 
democracy would prevail as the Third Wave of democracy continued to cover the globe. 
However, history has shown that past democratic waves have been followed by an 
authoritarian regression as the enthusiasm and momentum associated with 
democratisation wane (Brooker, 2014). Diamond (2015) has argued that rather than 
dictatorships continuing to decline, since 2006 their numbers have stabilised and there has 
instead been the beginning of a democratic recession. The four trends Diamond (2015: 144) 
points to in driving the recession are accelerated rate of democratic breakdown, declining 
quality of democracy, deepening of authoritarianism in strategically important countries and 
a waning of interest in democracy promotion by established democratic states such as the 
United States. The experience of regimes in the former Soviet and Middle East and North 
African regions following the Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring has also demonstrated 
the difficulty in establishing new democratic regimes (see Aras and Falk, 2015; Finkel and 
Brudney, 2012). In addition, authoritarian regimes are becoming increasingly adept at 
operating in a globalised world, using a variety of mechanisms to secure their interests. 
History suggests that democratic regimes that struggle to manage expectations and rising 
populist challenges are potentially vulnerable to de-democratisation (on the Weimar 
Republic, see Berman (1997)). Therefore, in considering authoritarian regimes we must be 
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conscious of the ways in which they evolve to meet international norms and expectations as 
such changes may render them more attractive in an era of democratic crisis.  
 
Conclusion 
The books considered in this essay explore the workings of authoritarian regimes, 
particularly issues of motivation and capacity. The collection from Backes and Kailitz 
emphasises the importance of ideology in providing legitimacy and purpose for particular 
regimes. However, they also illustrate the ways that successful regimes have evolved over 
time to appear less offensive to outside observers, adopting practices deemed legitimate by 
the international community. Questions of appearance are also important in BaĚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ
ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ĂƐblack knight. Broadly operating within the guidelines of international 
engagement, China has been able to develop authoritarian allies internationally as a way of 
supporting its own ideological and material base. Finally, at the domestic level, Giraudy 
illustrates the way in which subnational authoritarian regimes are able to manipulate the 
desire of the central state for stability to perpetuate their existence. Together, they 
demonstrate the ability of authoritarian regimes to adapt and take on forms of governance 
that ensure a degree of legitimacy and stability. 
 
Authoritarian regimes present an ongoing challenge in the contemporary era and will 
continue to do so as democratic systems face periodic crises and challenges. The aim of this 
essay was to identify common themes in the governance of authoritarian regimes and how 
these have changed and evolved in relation to the external environment. The increased 
diversity of authoritarian political systems, represented in the sophisticated use of 
democratic institutions and practices by hybrid authoritarian regimes, results in an apparent 
reduction in distance from their democratic counterparts. Pressures on established 
democracies associated with populism and anti-politics mean that assessments of the 
strength of democracy need to be more attuned to shifts in patterns of governance that 
may suggest periods of de-democratisation. Moving beyond simple binary classifications of 
authoritarian and democratic regimes is an important step in generating a more nuanced 
understanding of their operation and in unearthing hidden practices. The themes identified 
in this essay point to the resilience of authoritarian regimes as individual entities, as well as 
highlighting their role in influencing the wider international context. When combined with 
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an environment where support for democratic norms appears to be softening it is clear that 
giving greater attention to the way in which authoritarian regimes are governed is 
necessary. 
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